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Abstract
We consider the Hotelling-Downs model with n  2 oce seeking
candidates and runo voting. We show that Nash equilibria in pure
strategies always exist and that there are typically multiple equilib-
ria, both convergent (all candidates are located at the median) and
divergent (candidates locate at distinct positions), though only diver-
gent equilibria are robust to free entry. Moreover, two-policy equilibria
exist under any distribution of voters' ideal policies, while equilibria
with more than two policies exist generically but under restrictive con-
ditions that we characterize. In this sense, our analysis suggests that
two-policy equilibria are the most prominent outcomes.
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1 Introduction
The Hotelling-Downs (HD henceforth; see Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957))
model has remained central in the theoretical literature on electoral competi-
tion. In the classic version of that model, two purely oce seeking politicians
choose their policy platforms independently and simultaneously and voters
vote to elect their leader based upon their preferences over the policy space.
The model supports the celebrated result that a unique Nash equilibrium
exists for any distribution of voters' ideal policies where both players choose
the platform of the median voter. Osborne (1993) however has shown that
in the HD model with sincere voting1 under the rst-past-the-post (FPTP)
system, if there are more than two players, a Nash equilibrium in pure strate-
gies fails to exist generically. While the FPTP system is widely used and by
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1now well understood analytically, the Runo system is no less popular, yet
little studied. It is used in the French presidential, legislative and cantonal
elections. It is also used to elect the presidents of many other European
and Latin American nations including Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus,
Finland, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Brazil, Chile and Columbia,
to name a few.
In this paper we investigate the existence and characterisation of Nash
equilibria in the HD model when the voting system is runo, rather than
FPTP. A runo system can be generally described as follows. In the rst
round a candidate is elected if she gets the largest share of the votes and the
share is at least z% of the votes2. If no candidate gets more than z% of the
votes in the rst round, then a subset of candidates is selected according to a
pre-specied criterion to run in a second round, where the winner is decided
by FPTP. The most widely used version has z = 50, i.e. a candidate wins at
the rst round only if she gets the absolute majority; otherwise the subset
of candidates moving to the second round is given by the two top voted
candidates3. Examples of the `classic' version with z = 50 and the two
top vote-getters moving to the second round are given by the presidential
elections in Chile, Colombia, France and Poland, as well as federal and state-
level oces in some US states. The presidential elections in Argentina and
Costarica are examples of runo systems with z < 50 (z = 45 in Argentina
and z = 40 in Costarica).
We assume that at least three players are present; this is the only inter-
esting case, since with two players, runo is equivalent to FPTP. We show
that for n = 3 there is only one equilibrium which always exists, with all
players located at the median. When n > 3 however the equilibrium set
expands considerably. Besides the convergent equilibria which exist for any
n  3 and for any distribution of voters' ideologies, there is a continuum of
divergent equilibria in which the candidates choose positions dierent from
the median. The intuition comes from the fact that in a runo system one
has to worry not only about the share of the vote in the rst round, but also
about what happens in the second round. To see that convergent equilibria
where all players locate at the median always exist, consider a possible de-
viation. By moving slightly right or left a candidate can get (almost) 50%
of the vote and thus be sure to be selected for the second round. However,
in the second round the deviating candidate will face an opponent located
2There are some possible complications in actually used runo systems that we are
going to ignore in this paper. For example, in the French legislative elections winning at
the rst round requires not only getting at least 50% of the valid votes, but also at least
25% of registered voters. In this paper we will ignore abstention, so there is no dierence
between potential voters and actual voters. See Grofman (2008) for a general taxonomy
of runo methods.
3An example with a dierent rule is given by the French legislative elections, where
every candidate who gets at least 12.5% of the vote is allowed to run in the second round.
2at the median, meaning defeat with probability one. Thus, such deviation
is unprotable. To see how divergent equilibria can be sustained, consider
four candidates and suppose that candidates 1 and 2 locate at m   e while
candidates 3 and 4 locate at m + e, where m is the median and e is su-
ciently small. Each candidate collects one fourth of the votes and has an
equal chance of being selected for the second round, where (whatever the
consequent selection is) the two candidates will have an equal chance to win.
Now consider a potential deviation by player 1. For e small, moving slightly
to the left will typically increase the vote share of the candidate, thus ensur-
ing that player 1 will go to the second stage with probability 1. However,
at that stage the candidate will lose for sure, given that the position he
occupies is the farthest away from the median. This makes the deviation
unprotable. Moving to the right, for e small, cannot be protable either,
since candidate 1 ends up decreasing his vote share and being excluded from
the second round.
In this intuitive example, multiple candidates occupy each of the ex-
treme positions. We show that this is a general characteristic of divergent
equilibria: extreme policies are always proposed by at least two players. We
also show that in equilibrium all players who contest the election must have
the same vote share in round one and that while in all equilibria any of the
positions represented can win the election, positions closer to the median
have a higher probability of winning. Thus, in a divergent equilibrium the
probability of winning the elections is strictly decreasing with the distance
from the median.
How many dierent policy platforms can be represented in a divergent
equilibrium? We show that, for n > 3, and for any arbitrary distribution of
voters' ideologies, a continuum of two-policy equilibria exist. In each such
equilibrium, the policy positions which are occupied are symmetric around
the median and an equal number of candidates enter at each position. Next,
we show that three-policy equilibria are generically possible, though unlike
the two-policy case, existence is not always guaranteed. In every generic
case, the middle policy is proposed by a single player while the extreme
policies are symmetric about the median and are proposed by an equal
number of players. Interestingly, this middle policy is never the median
voter's ideal policy in any generic situation. It is important to note that in
the FPTP system as studied in Osborne (1993), while no equilibrium exists
generically, two-policy equilibria can exist while three policy equilibria must
have each of the policies proposed by two candidates.4
We then address equilibria with more than three policy platforms. We
show that such equilibria exist generically only if n  6, although existence
is not guaranteed and requires additional conditions on the distribution.
4The result about three policy equilibria is not shown in Osborne (1993). In our
analysis we provide an argument that implies this result.
3Moreover, the observation made above regarding the internal policy in a
3-policy equilibrium is a general feature: in any generic situation, all in-
ternal policies are proposed by exactly one player. Interestingly, extreme
policies do not necessarily have to be symmetric around the median: in
fact, if the number of policies is even, then these extreme policies cannot be
symmetric, while if they are odd, equilibria can support symmetry as well
as non-symmetry. Our analysis also suggests that although k  3-policy
equilibria exist generically, the conditions required on the distribution of
ideal policies become very restrictive, and hence one may suggest they are
less likely in an arbitrary election. If free entry is allowed for, it then turns
out that the 2-policy equilibria are the most prominent outcomes.
Finally, we consider how the results on the equilibrium set vary when
variations on the classic rules are adopted; specically, we consider the case
in which z < 50 and the case in which more than two candidates are admitted
to the second round. We show that in these cases an equilibrium may fail
to exist, and that when equilibria exist, they are necessarily divergent and
that they tend to be more `extremist' (the candidates locate farther away
from the median) than in the classic case.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss
the literature on the subject. Section 3 spells out the model. In Section 4
we characterize the equilibrium set and in Section 5 we discuss under what
conditions various types of equilibria exist. Section 6 is dedicated to the
analysis of equilibria in which more than two policies are proposed and
Section 7 explores variations on the `classic' case. Section 8 contains the
conclusions. All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 Related literature
The two papers most closely related to our work are Haan and Volkerink
(2001) and Callander (2005). The rst paper studies exactly the HD model
with runo (case z = 50) to address convergent equilibria and shows that
for all distributions of voters' ideologies, an equilibrium always exists where
all players enter as candidates at the median. We show that this is only
a subset of the equilibrium set, and that when there are at least 4 players
there are many divergent equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which the candidates
locate at multiple policy positions. Furthermore, we show that for some
variations of the `classic' rule the convergent equilibrium disappears5. More
importantly, it also disappears if there is free entry of players in the political
system, while divergent equilibria are in this sense robust.
5Matsushima (2007) extends the HD model to allow for aggregate uncertainty (i.e.
the position of the median voter is uncertain at the time players choose their policy
platforms). He shows that when the distribution function for the position of the median
voter is continuous, the single-policy convergence result of Haan and Volkerink (2001) fails
to hold.
4Callander (2005) considers a model which is slightly dierent from ours.
The variation is that he considers a two-period entry game in which n estab-
lished candidates select a location in period 1 and then a potential entrant
decides whether to enter, and at what location, in period 2 (this is an ex-
tension of the Palfrey (1984) model of entry deterrence6). The focus of the
paper is on two-candidate equilibria under runo voting, since the existence
of such equilibria challenges the conjecture (due to Duverger) that the runo
system typically supports many more candidates7. Dierently from this pa-
per, Callander (2005) does not try to characterize the whole equilibrium set;
rather, he proposes some equilibria, without discussing the general proper-
ties that equilibrium congurations have to satisfy. In this paper we instead
start discussing the properties that any equilibrium must satisfy and then
proceed to characterize the whole set of generic equilibria.
One important assumption made by Callander (2005) is that the entrant
is less recognizable than the other candidates, so that if she enters at a
position already occupied by an incumbent she receives no votes. He shows
that when there are two incumbents (besides the potential entrant) then all
the equilibria are divergent. In our model, the only equilibrium when there
are less than 4 players is convergent and we do not have equilibria in which
only two candidates enter; Callander obtains such an equilibrium because
of his assumption on the advantage of incumbency8. Another important
dierence with Callander (2005) is that he considers only distributions with
a density symmetric around the median and increasing up to the median (i.e.
`bell-shaped'), a set of distributions which is non-generic. We consider all
non-atomic distributions and show that the multi-policy equilibria discussed
in Callander (2005) can be obtained generically though not universally, while
two-policy equilibria are robust in this sense.
A number of papers have analysed the runo rule in models dierent
from the classic HD model, usually comparing FPTP and runo. Osborne
and Slivinski (1996) show that in a citizen{candidate model multi-candidate
equilibria are more likely under runo than under FPTP. Also, in every two-
candidate equilibrium, runo reduces extremism when compared to FPTP.
Bordignon and Tabellini (2009) compare FPTP versus runo voting in a
model where four politicians can form pre-electoral coalitions and present
their policy platforms, while the voters are of four ideological types and
voting is sincere. They show that under runo the number of candidates
6In Palfrey (1984), there are exactly two established candidates and they do not have
the option to quit the competition. In Callander (2005) this restriction is relaxed.
7Wright and Riker (1989) present empirical evidence suggesting that the runo systems
tend to have a larger number of candidates. See also Cox (1997) for an analytical study
of the Duverger's Hypothesis under the runo rule.
8The assumption that the entrant gets zero votes when its platform coincide with that
of an incumbent is stronger than needed. Callander's results on two-candidate equilibria
could be obtained simply by assuming that an entrant gets fewer votes than an incumbent
located at the same policy position.
5is typically larger than under FPTP, although the inuence of extremist
voters is smaller as their bargaining power is reduced. Finally, Messner and
Polborn (2007) study electoral competition with a small number of voters
who are able to form coalitions and compare the two voting systems, taking
the policies as exogenously given. They nd that if there are three policies,
then no strong equilibrium exists under the FPTP rule while it does so under
runo, provided there is a Condorcet winner. A coalition proof equilibrium
appears in both systems even when there is a Condorcet cycle.
3 The model
We adopt notation and terminology from Osborne (1993). A policy is a
point on the real line R. Let N = f1;:::;ng be the set of players, with
n  3. The strategy set for each player i 2 N is Si = R [ fOutg and a pure
strategy for player i 2 N is an element si 2 Si. If si 2 R, then it is the
policy that player i proposes in order to contest the elections as a candidate,
while if si = Out, then the player chooses to stay out of competition. A
strategy prole is denoted by s 2
Q
i2N Si. Players act simultaneously and
independently.
There is a continuum of voters, each having a unique ideal policy in R.
Ideal policies of the voters are distributed over R according to a distribution
F. We will consider the class of distributions that can be represented by a
density f with a connected support, and we will call this class F. If f 2 F
then there is a unique median, which will be denoted by m. We will also
refer to the quantiles of the distribution F, denoting the k'th p-quantile (i.e.
the point x 2 R such that F(x) = k
p) by qk=p. When f 2 F the quantiles
are uniquely determined for all strictly positive integers k and p with k < p.
Voting is sincere, that is each voter votes for a candidate oering a
policy that is closest to his ideal point. Given a policy x 2 R the mass of
voters that vote for that policy is called the constituency of x. Left and
right constituencies are dened in the usual way. The left constituency of a
policy x will be denoted by l(x), the right constituency of x will be denoted
by r(x) and the total constituency of x will be denoted by (x). If left and
right constituencies are equal, then the support of the policy will be called
balanced. If k candidates oer the same policy, then each of them receives
votes equal to the same fraction 1=k of the constituency of that policy.
Elections follow the runo rule where the winner is determined as follows:
if some candidate obtains strictly more than z% of votes, then she is the
winner. Otherwise, the winner is the candidate who obtains a majority in
the second round between the two candidates who obtained the most votes
in the rst round. All ties (be it in the selection of the two candidates from
the rst round, or the eventual winner from the second round) are broken
with equiprobable draws. Except for Section 7, we will consider the `classic'
6case of z = 50.
Candidates are purely oce-seeking, that is, they care only about win-
ning the elections. More exactly, let Pi (s) be the probability that player
i 2 N is the elected candidate under strategy prole s. We assume that
s is strictly preferred to s0 by candidate i when either Pi (s) > Pi (s0) or
Pi (s) = Pi (s0) = 0 and si = Out, s0
i 6= Out. In other words, a candidate
prefers strategy proles where the probability of victory is higher and it
prefers to stay out rather than running when the probability of victory is
zero. We omit the natural assumption of preferring to win outright in the
rst round, because it does not aect the results obtained.
3.1 Policy prole and genericity
A policy prole is a collection X = (X;%), where X = fx1;:::;xkg  R
is called the set of policies and % : X ! N+ is a function that assigns to
each policy xi 2 X the number of candidates proposing xi, with %(xi)  1
for each xi 2 X. In particular, we will call a policy proposed by exactly
one candidate an unary policy, a policy proposed by exactly two candidates
a binary policy, etc. We will also use %(X) =
P
xi2X %(x) to denote the
total number of candidates in the policy prole X = (X;%). The policy
prole X = (?;?) is called the empty policy prole. If X is non-empty and
X = fx1;:::;xkg, then we will use a convention that i < j implies xi < xj.
Moreover, if k > 1, then we will call such a prole divergent, and if k = 1,
then the prole will be called convergent.






(for i 2 f1;:::;k   1g) to denote the border between the support of the
policies xi and xi+1. The border of any two policies identies the position
of voters indierent between these policies.
Each strategy prole s determines a policy prole Xs = (Xs;%s). If s is
a Nash equilibrium then Xs is called an equilibrium strategy prole.





Under an even policy prole, each candidate obtains the same mass of votes,
equal to 1
%(X). As we will show, any equilibrium policy prole is even. Notice
that in even policy proles, the borders between supports of policies are
proper %(X)-quantiles. More precisely
bX




7that is it is the
Pi
j=1 %(xj)'th %(X)-quantile.
We will focus on equilibria which are generic. More precisely, we consider
the following notion of genericity. Let the distance between two density
functions f and g in F be given by
jjf   gjj =
Z
jf (x)   g (x)jdx
and let
B (f) = fg 2 F jjjf   gjj < g
be an open -ball around f. Suppose that for a given distribution f there
is a Nash equilibrium sf inducing a policy prole X = (X;%) with X =
fx1;:::;xkg. Then we say that the Nash equilibrium sf is generic if for
each " > 0 it is possible to nd  > 0 such that for each f0 2 B (f) there
is a Nash equilibrium sf0 inducing a policy prole X 0 = (X0;%) with X0 =
fx0
1;:::;x0
kg such that jxi   x0
ij < " and %(x0
i) = %(xi) for each i = 1;:::;k.
In other words, a Nash equilibrium is generic if, whenever we slightly vary
the distribution, it is possible to nd another Nash equilibrium with the
same number of candidates for each of the ordered positions and positions
which are very close to the initial ones. In particular, an equilibrium with
k policy positions is not generic if for each  > 0 it is possible to nd
f0 2 B (f) such that there is no equilibrium with k policy positions at f0.
The following fact, generalizing an observation already made in Osborne
(1993) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996), will be useful in identifying non-
generic equilibria.
Fact 1. Fix a divergent policy prole X = (fx1;:::;xkg;%). Evenness and
at least one of the following points:
1. there exists 1 < i < k such that l(xi) = r(xi) and xi   xi 1 =
xi+1   xi,
2. there exists 1  i < j  k such that l(xi) = r(xi) and l(xj) =
r(xj),
are non-generic properties of the distribution.
In other words, given a divergent policy prole, any distribution F under
which this policy prole is even and either has an internal policy with a
balanced support of equal lengths of left and right constituencies, or has
two dierent policies, each of them with a balanced support, is non-generic.
4 Equilibrium characterisation
There are some obvious properties that must be satised by any equilibrium
conguration. Clearly, it can't be the case that there are no candidates, since
8in that case any player can protably deviate by entering and winning the
election with probability 1. Furthermore, given the way in which we dened
the preferences, each entrant must have a strictly positive probability of
winning. The following lemma states some straightforward properties of
any Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1. Let s be a Nash equilibrium with policy prole Xs = (fx1;:::;xkg;%).
Then:
1. k  1 and the probability of victory for each i 2 N such that si 6= Out
is strictly positive.
2. If exactly two candidates enter, then they must tie in the rst round.
If three or more candidates enter, then either they all tie in the rst
round or one candidate gets the highest vote share in the rst round
while all other candidates tie for the second place.
3. If k  2, then x1 < m < xk.
Point 1 follows directly from our assumption on the players' preferences.
Point 2 also follows from the fact that all the candidates entering the contest
must have a strictly positive probability of winning. Thus, each candidate
must be at least second in the rst round in order to have a positive chance
to go to the second round. Point 3 proves the fairly intuitive result that
whenever at least two positions are occupied they cannot be on the same
side of the median. If all candidates are on one side of the median, say
x1  m, then there must be multiple candidates at the extreme position
xk. If not, the lone candidate at xk would lose with probability one in any
runo and it would be better o choosing Out. But if there are multiple
candidates at xk it is easy to show that any of them can protably deviate
to m ", for some " suciently small, and win the election with probability
1.
The rest of the section will establish further properties that a Nash
equilibrium must satisfy. In Proposition 1 we will develop some general
properties of the equilibria, while Proposition 2 is devoted to the analysis
of equilibria in which multiple policies are proposed. In the next section we
will show that equilibria, both convergent and divergent, do in fact exist.
Proposition 1. Suppose Xs = (fx1;:::;xkg;%) is a policy prole induced
by a Nash equilibrium s. Then:
1. Whenever k  2, extreme policies must be proposed by at least two
candidates.
2. Xs is even, so that all candidates tie for rst place in the rst round.
3. Whenever k  3, the probability of winning the election by a candidate
is strictly decreasing in the distance of his policy from the median.
9Extreme policies must be proposed by multiple candidates since other-
wise a single candidate would benet from moving towards the median.9
This fact drives all the convergence results in HD models and it is also
present for FPTP. That in equilibrium all candidates must tie in the rst
round, is obvious when exactly two candidates enter. When more than two
candidates enter, it has to be the case that every candidate has a chance of
winning, and hence of moving to the second round. We know by Lemma 1
that either all candidates tie or there is a single candidate with strictly
highest vote share, say candidate w at position xw, and all the others tie for
second place. The winner must be the only one occupying her policy posi-
tion (since she is not tying) and thus it cannot occupy an extreme position,
since we have established that such positions are occupied by at least two
candidates. Furthermore, w goes to the second round with probability 1,
since it is the unique winner at the rst round. But this implies that the
extremist candidates on the same side of the median as w have no chance of
winning the election. Thus the proposed policy prole cannot be the result
of a Nash equilibrium. Finally, since all candidates have the same vote share
in the rst round, each pair of candidates has an equal probability of going
to the second round, where the candidate closer to the median is bound
to win or each candidate wins with probability 1
2 if their distance from the
median is the same. Thus, a candidate closer to the median is more likely
to be matched with an opponent who is more far away from it.
The property that extreme policies must be occupied by multiple can-
didates holds also under the FPTP rule. However, under FPTP there is an
incentive for candidates to move away from the median if there are already
multiple candidates at that position and the constituency on at least one side
of the median is larger than the share of votes obtained by each candidate
proposing the policy. For this reason extreme policies have to be proposed
by at most two candidates and have to have balanced constituencies. The
implication of this, as shown by Osborne (1993), is that divergent equilibria,
although possible, are non-generic under the FPTP rule.
Under the runo rule extreme policies also have to be proposed by mul-
tiple candidates, but moving further away from the median is costly, as it
leads to losing the second round. This means that extreme policies can-
not exceed certain bounds. The next proposition states the properties of
equilibria in which multiple policy positions are taken.
For any policy prole Xs = (X;%), with X = fx1;:::;xkg, if k  3, call
internal a policy xi such that i = 2 f1;kg.
9Callander (2005) nds an equilibrium in which only one candidate enters at each
location. The existence of these equilibria is due to the dierent game form that he
considers, with a potential entrant moving after the two incumbents. The reason why
a candidate does not want to move towards the median is that this ends up inducing
entry. We instead consider a game with simultaneous entry, and in this game there are
no equilibria in which only two players enter.
10Proposition 2. Let s be a Nash equilibrium and let Xs = (X;%), with
X = fx1;:::;xkg and k  2. Then:
1. q %(x1) 1
%(Xs)
 x1 and xk  q %(Xs) %(xk)+1
%(Xs)
. Moreover, either the extreme
policies are symmetric about the median or one of them is proposed by
exactly two candidates, has balanced constituency and is strictly closer
to the median than the other one.
2. If k  3, then the median voter never votes for an extreme policy.
3. If k  3, then all the internal policies are proposed by at most two
candidates, and if such a policy is proposed by two candidates, then
its support is balanced. Moreover, no internal policy proposed by ex-
actly one candidate may lie between two binary policies with balanced
support.
In the case of internal (i.e. not extreme) policies, their basic proper-
ties under runo are like under FPTP system. Each such policy is at most
binary and those of them that are binary must have a balanced support.
The fact that the mass of both left and right constituency of such poli-
cies is restricted to be no larger than the share of votes obtained by each
of the proposing candidates has the same reasons in the case of both sys-
tems: there is an incentive for candidates proposing such policies to move
towards the constituency larger than this share. Additionally a unary policy
can never lie between two binary policies with balanced constituency. This
property follows from the assumption that players are purely oce-seeking.
If a candidate proposes his policy alone and his policy is between two bi-
nary policies with balanced constituencies, then there is always a protable
deviation for him within the interval bounded by those two policies. This is
true in the case of FPTP system as well and it implies, in particular, that
all three-policy equilibria must have each of the policies proposed by exactly
two candidates under that system.10
5 Existence of equilibria
In this section we discuss the existence of both convergent and divergent
equilibria. As pointed out in the introduction, under FPTP the only case
in which an equilibrium generically exists is when n = 2, and in that case
the only equilibrium is convergent. Haan and Volkerink (2001) have shown
that under the runo rule there are convergent equilibria for any n, and that
convergent equilibria are such that all players enter and position themselves
at the median.
10This fact is not shown in Osborne (1993), but was already observed in Dziubi nski and
Roy (2009).
11Proposition 3 (Haan and Volkerink). Let n  2 be the number of players.
Then there always exists an equilibrium in which all players enter at the
median. This is the only convergent equilibrium.
That having all candidates positioned at the median is an equilibrium
follows from the fact that whenever a candidate moves away from the median
then she can improve (for n  3) her vote share in the rst period, but then
in the second period she will lose for sure because she will be matched with
a candidate located at the median. Notice that having n < n candidates
entering cannot be an equilibrium, since any of the players choosing Out
could enter at the median and win with probability 1
n+1. Also, no point
dierent from the median can be occupied in a convergent equilibrium, since
in that case moving to the median would guarantee outright victory in the
rst round.
Proposition 1 implies that the existence of a divergent equilibrium re-
quires at least four players, as there are at least two extreme positions and
each of them must be occupied by at least two candidates. Combining this
with Proposition 3 we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If n = 3 then the only equilibrium is convergent. All players
enter and position themselves at the median.
Proposition 3 shows that the HD model is not plagued by non-existence
when runo, rather than FPTP, is used. What about uniqueness? For
n = 2 runo is equivalent to FPTP, so the median voter theorem applies.
Corollary 1 shows that the median voter theorem is preserved for n = 3.
When n  4 divergent equilibria appear and the rest of this section
will be devoted to analysing such equilibria. Such possibility was already
observed by Callander (2005) for the case of bell-shaped distributions sym-
metric about the median. To be sure, in the case of symmetric distributions,
two policy equilibria exist also under FPTP. However such equilibria are not
generic, as shown in Osborne (1993). We show that they are possible for any
non-atomic distribution and fully characterize the set of two-policy equilib-
ria. As we show below, in all two-policy equilibria the platforms proposed
must be symmetric about the median and each of them must be proposed by
the same number of candidates. By Proposition 1 this number must be at
least two. These features are similar to those observed by Callander (2005)
for the case of symmetric distributions.
Let r  2 and consider a policy prole where m   e and m + e are the
only policies proposed and each of them is proposed by r candidates. By
point 1 of Proposition 2 we know already that extreme policies cannot be
too far from the median, if this is to be an equilibrium policy prole. This
is related to the threat of inward deviations by the candidates proposing
extreme policies. Thus there is a threshold value dr(F) such that a candidate
proposing one of the extreme positions could protably deviate inwards i
12e  dr(F). For r  3, dr(F) is the minimum value such that if e = dr(F),
then a candidate proposing an extreme position could deviate inwards and
tie for the rst place. For r = 2 this is insucient, because a deviation
inwards could be protable even if the deviating candidate lost but tied
for the second place in the rst round. In this case dr(F) is dened to be
the minimum value such that if e = dr(F), then a candidate proposing an
extreme position could deviate inwards and tie for the second place. It is
easy to see that for any distribution F and for any r  2, it must be that
dr(F) > 0.
Additionally, if such equilibria are also robust to free entry (that is, if
there are players who stay out of the elections, a case possible only if n > 4),
then the requirement to block entry also aects the distance between the
two policies. For any given policy conguration fm   e;m + eg, the vote
share of a player located at y 2 (m   e;m + e) is the same, whether this
player is a new entrant or a repositioning old candidate. However, in the
case of the new entrant the remaining votes are split among n candidates
while in the case of a deviator they are split among n 1 candidates. Thus,
new entry is typically more dangerous for an equilibrium than a deviation
and the conditions to make sure that a conguration is an equilibrium are
stricter when some players stay out of the competition. In other words,
equilibria in which some players stay out typically have positions closer to
the median than equilibria in which all players enter.
As we pointed out already, under runo the threat of entry applies only
to the area between the two policies. Let er(F) > 0 be the minimal value
such that if e  er(F), then there is a position within (m   e;m + e) such
that a player could enter there and gain the support 1
2r+1.
We are now ready to state the following proposition which shows that
two-policy equilibria always exist provided n  4. Moreover, it gives a
complete characterisation in the case where the number of candidates is less
then the number of players or when n = 4.
Proposition 4. Let n  4. Then for any non-atomic distribution F with
unique median m, any 2  r  n=2 and any 0 < e < minfer(F);dr(F)g
there exists a two-policy Nash equilibrium with policy prole Xs = (fm  
e;m + eg;%) and %(m   e) = %(m + e) = r. Moreover, if s is a Nash
equilibrium with policy prole Xs = (fx1;x2g;%), then the following hold:
1. x1 = m   e and x2 = m + e, for some e > 0.
2. n  4 and %(x1) = %(x2)  2.
3. e < dr(F).
4. If some players stay out of competition, that is %(Xs) < n, then e <
er(F).
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there is a position t 2 (m   e;m + e) that allows a player staying out of
the elections to enter and tie for the rst place, then a candidate from one
of the extreme positions could deviate to t, which would always guarantee
him going to the second round with a probability of at least 1=3 (where he
would win). Hence his overall probability of winning the elections increases
above 1=4, the probability with which he was winning originally. Thus for
r = 2 point 4 is automatically guaranteed. For r  3, on the other hand, it
holds that dr(F)  er(F). This is because if there is a protable deviation
to some position t 2 (m   e;m + e) by a candidate proposing one of the
extreme policies, then a deviator must at least tie for the rst place. In
particular, he must tie with the candidates proposing his original position.
Thus if a candidate staying out of the elections would enter at t, then he
would tie with candidates proposing one of the extreme positions and defeat
all the candidates proposing the other extreme position. Hence for r  3
both points 3 and 4 are needed.
Remark 1. Convergent equilibria are always such that all players enter at
the median. One implication is that this type of equilibria cannot survive
free entry, as the number of candidates would go to innity (here we assume
that only equilibria with a nite number of candidates are interesting). By
contrast, divergent equilibria do not suer from this shortcoming. As long
as n > 4 there are always divergent equilibria in which at least one player
decides to stay out. Adding additional players does not change the basic
incentives of the equilibrium: each additional potential entrant will still nd
optimal to stay out (this is similar to Callander (2005), but he assumes that
an entrant located at the same position as an incumbent gets a vote share
of zero). It should be pointed out, however, that the non-existence problem
for the convergent equilibrium disappears if there is a strictly positive cost
of entry. Denoting b the benet of winning the election and c the cost of
participation, when there is free entry it is an equilibrium that exactly n < n
candidates enter at the median, where n is such that b
n+1 < c  b
n.
6 Equilibria with three or more policies
Equilibria with more than two policies are generically possible, however
unlike the two-policy case, not every non-atomic distribution can support
them. In this section we give characterisation of such equilibria and discuss
the properties of distributions that allow for their existence.
6.1 Three-policy equilibria
As we explained in Section 4, the only three-policy equilibria that are possi-
ble under FPTP rule with purely oce-seeking players must have each of the
14policies proposed by exactly two candidates. Moreover, such equilibria are
non-generic. In this section we show that in the case of runo system three
policy equilibria are generically possible. Moreover, in any generic case the
middle policy is always proposed by a single candidate, while extreme posi-
tions are symmetric about the median and are proposed by an equal number
of candidates. Depending on the properties of the distribution many such
equilibria can exist. However, there can be at most one such equilibrium for
any given number of candidates.
In Callander (2005) it is shown that three-policy equilibria are possi-
ble under runo if the distribution is symmetric about the median and
bell-shaped. Equilibrium considered there have extreme policies symmet-
ric about the median and exactly one candidate proposing m. Interestingly,
this symmetry is not due to symmetry of the distribution. As we show, all
the generic three-policy equilibria have extreme policies symmetric about
the median. However, the candidate proposing the internal policy is never
proposing m in any generic case. In the case of distributions considered
in Callander (2005) it is also possible to have three-policy equilibria with
each of the three-policies proposed by exactly two candidates. As we show
below such equilibria are not generic (note that symmetry of the distribution
is not a generic property).
We start with identifying the properties that have to be satised by any
generic three-policy equilibrium. These properties are pretty sharp: generic
three policy equilibria must have exactly one candidate at the internal policy
which is never the median voters' ideal point, the same number of candidates
at the extreme positions and have extreme policies symmetric around the
median.
Proposition 5. Let n be the number of players and suppose that s is a
generic Nash equilibrium with policy prole Xs = (fx1;x2;x3g;%). Then the
following hold
1. %(x1) = %(x3) = r with 2r + 1  n.
2. x1 = m + q r
2r+1   q r+1
2r+1
, x3 = m   q r
2r+1 + q r+1
2r+1





3. %(x2) = 1 and %(x1) = %(x3)  2 .
Proposition 5 establishes the properties of generic three-policy equilibria.
The question is whether such equilibria can exist at all. In Proposition 6
below we give necessary and sucient conditions that a distribution has to
satisfy to allow for existence of a three-policy equilibrium with c candidates.
The conditions we give are for the case of equilibria with some of the players
staying out of the elections (that is c < n). In the case of full participation
equilibria (when c = n) these conditions can be weakened, as remarked after
the proposition.
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es exactly a three-policy prole with c = 2r + 1
candidates. To guarantee that this prole is an equilibrium policy prole,
the distribution has to be such that the following deviations from the players
are not protable:
(a). repositioning by the candidate proposing x2 within the interval (x1;x3),
(b). new entry in the interval (x1;x2) or in the interval (x2;x3).
(c). repositioning by a candidate proposing x1 in the interval (x1;x2) and
repositioning by a candidate proposing x3 in the interval (x2;x3),
All the remaining possible deviations are either never protable or are not
protable if the deviations above are ruled out. Moreover, if there are players
staying out of the elections, then ruling out entry is enough to rule out
repositioning by the candidates proposing extreme positions. We now move
to dene a class of distribution functions that will be necessary and sucient
to block these deviations.
For any integer r  2, let Fr be a class of densities such that for each
f 2 Fr with median m and its corresponding distribution F, the following
properties hold:
1. for all t 2
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16Notice that the restrictions imposed by conditions 1 { 4 leave some scope
of freedom and so they are robust to small perturbations of the distributions
satisfying them (hence they are generic). For example, they are satised by
any density which is suciently close to uniform within the interval (x1;x3).




) and u 2 (x1;q r
2r+1)[(q r+1
2r+1
;x3) and with the mass suciently
evenly distributed with the interval (q r
2r+1;q r+1
2r+1
) (so that points 3 { 4 hold)
satisfy this property. There are even densities with f(t) < f(u) (where t
and u are as above) that satisfy these properties, although in this case the
densities must be suciently close to uniform within the interval (x1;x3).
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Let r  2 and n > 2r + 1. Then there exists a Nash
equilibrium with policy prole Xs = (fx1;x2;x3g;%) such that m   x1 =
x3 m, %(x2) = 1 and %(x1) = %(x3) = r if and only if the voters' ideologies
are distributed according to some density f 2 Fr. Consequently, this Nash
equilibrium is generic.
For r > 2 and n = 2r+1 conditions 1 { 2 are necessary, while conditions 3
and 4 are sucient but not necessary for the result to hold. In this case
there is no threat of entry from a player who stays out of the elections and
weaker conditions are needed to prevent deviations by candidates proposing
extreme positions to positions within intervals (x1;x2) and (x2;x3).
It is also important to note that the properties 1 { 4 are of a local nature
in the sense that they concern the distribution within the interval (x1;x3).
Both pairs of conditions, (1 { 2 and 3 { 4) limit the speed of change of F at
dierent intervals within (x1;x3). This is needed to block protable devia-
tions within the interval (x1;x3) of the candidate proposing x2 (conditions 1
{ 2), as well as the threat of entry in this interval (conditions 3 { 4). Notice
that conditions 3 { 4 imply, in particular, that q r









 m   q r
2r+1, so that q r 1
2r+1
 x1 and x3  q r+2
2r+1
.
6.2 Equilibria with more than three policies
Equilibria with more than three policies can exist only if n  6. It turns out
that in any generic conguration of this kind internal policies are proposed
by exactly one candidate. Hence, unariness of internal policies is indeed
a general feature of any divergent equilibrium. Moreover, if the number
of policies is even, then one of the extreme policies must be proposed by
exactly two candidates. In this case the two extreme policies are not sym-
metric about the median and the one closer to the median has a balanced
constituency. If the number of policies is odd then both cases, of extreme
policies being symmetric about the median and of extreme policies being
17non-symmetric about the median, are possible. We also show that the poli-
cies proposed in any generic equilibrium are uniquely determined by the
distribution, the number of policies and the number of candidates (we omit
the formulas specing this uniqueness relation in the proposition below for
the sake of clarity, and move them to the Appendix, where the following
proposition is proven).
Proposition 7. Let n be the number of players and suppose that s is a Nash
equilibrium with policy prole Xs = (fx1;:::;xkg;%), where %(Xs) = c and
k  4. Then the following holds in any generic case:
1. The values of x1;:::;xk are uniquely determined by F, k and c.
2. For all i 2 f2;:::;k   1g, %(xi) = 1.
3. If k is even, then m   x1 6= xk   m. Moreover, if m   x1 < xk   m,
then %(x1) = 2 and x1 has a balanced support, and if m x1 > xk m,
then %(xk) = 2 and xk has a balanced support.
As in the case of three-policy equilibria, the k-policy proles with k  4
and c candidates are determined uniquely by the distribution. To guarantee
that these proles are equilibrium policy proles, the distribution has to
satisfy several properties guaranteeing that no deviations by the players are
possible in the associated strategy proles. It is sucient and necessary to
rule out the following deviations:
(a). for each 3  i  k   2, repositioning by the candidate proposing xi
within the interval (xi 1;xi+1),
(b). new entry in the interval (x1;x3) or in the interval (xk 2;xk).
(c). repositioning by a candidate proposing x1 in the interval (x1;x2) and
repositioning by a candidate proposing xk in the interval (xk 1;xk),
Notice that if a deviation by a candidate proposing an internal policy xi < m,
with 3  i  k  2, to some position t 2 (xi;min(xi+1;m)) is not protable,
then there is no protable entry by a player staying out of the elections pos-
sible within this interval. This is because if such an entry was possible, then
the entrant would have to obtain at least the same support as that obtained
by each of the standing candidates. But then the candidate proposing xi
could also deviate to the point of entry, making his left neighbour win and
his right neighbour lose the rst round. Such a deviation would guarantee
winning the second round, upon being selected in the rst round. The prob-
ability of winning the elections by the deviator would increase from 1
c to
1
c 2. Similar observation holds for xi > m, with 3  i  k 2, and deviation
to some position t 2 (max(xi 1;m);xi).
As we discussed in the case with three-policy equilibria, entry at posi-
tions already taken by candidates or outside the external policies is never
18protable. It is also not protable for a candidate not to enter, if he has
a chance of winning the elections. Also a deviation by a candidate propos-
ing an internal policy to a position which is outside the interval bounded
by his neighbouring policies is never protable if entry at such positions is
not protable. Thus ruling out the deviations (a) { (c) is indeed sucient
and necessary to guarantee that the policy proles under consideration are
equilibrium policy proles.
Formal constraints on the distributions that are sucient and necessary
to rule out the deviations (a) { (c) are similar to those given in the case
of three-policy equilibria and we will focus on the constraints ruling out
deviations given in point (a) only. Suppose that 3  i  k   2 and that
xi < m (the case xi > m is symmetric). A deviation to some t 2 (xi 1;xi)
is protable if the deviator obtains a mass of votes which is larger than the
mass of votes gained by his right neighbour after the deviation. Thus to rule
out such a deviation, the distribution must satisfy, for all t 2 (0;xi   bi 1),
F(bi 1)   F(bi 1   t) < 2(F(bi)   F(bi + t)):
A deviation to some t 2 (xi;xi+1) is protable if it does not decrease the
mass of votes of the deviator. This is because, as we explained above, such
a deviation would make the left neighbour win the rst round, the right
neighbour lose the rst round and increase the probability of winning the
elections by the deviator. Thus to rule out such a deviation, the distribution
must satisfy, for all t 2 (0;bi   xi),
F(bi 1 + t)   F(bi 1) < 2(F(bi + t)   F(bi)):
Notice that the density function f can be neither constant nor increasing
over the interval [x3;m]. However, a density function decreasing over this
interval would satisfy the second property, and if its slope was not too large,
then it would satisfy the rst property. Also, distributions suciently close
to such a distribution would satisfy the requirements.
Generally, as in the case of three-policy equilibria, the constraints on
the distributions are of local nature and aect the distribution within the
interval (x1;xk) only. Moreover, they leave some scope of freedom, and can
always be sustained under suciently small perturbations. Hence equilib-
ria supporting k-policy proles with c candidates are generic, although the
distributions supporting them must satisfy special properties.
We then conclude our analysis with the following observations that sug-
gest that in the HD model a la Osborne (1993), multi-policy equilibria are
less likely in an arbitrary election. Let fx1;::;xkg be the policies. Then, ex-
istence requires restrictions on the distribution only in the support [x1;xk].
These requirements are dierent for k = 3 and k > 3. However, for k = 3,
the requirements are relatively less restrictive. Distributions that do not
decrease too rapidly on (x1;m), do not increase too rapidly on (m;x2), and
19do not have large concentrations of mass on small subintervals of the inter-
val (x1;x3) support existence. Examples of distributions that satisfy these
properties are distributions that are roughly uniform or which are roughly
single peaked over the interval (x1;x3) with the peak somewhere near the
median m. For k > 4 the requirements are quite restrictive. Roughly speak-
ing they require that the density function decreases (but not too fast) on
the interval (x3;m) and increases (but again, not too fast) on the interval
(m;xk 2). Examples of distributions that could satisfy these restrictions
are bimodal distributions, with x1 and xk lying on the internal slopes of
dierent 'bumps'. The case of k = 4 is quite delicate as well. If m is closer
to x1 or x2, then the requirements for it will be like in the case with ve
and more policy equilibria. The only case where m is not closer to one of
these two policies is where there are 2 candidates on each of the extremes.
In that case m is exactly on the border between x1 and x2.
7 Variations
Up to now we have analysed the benchmark case z = 50 (i.e. a majority of
votes is needed to win the rst round) and the two top most voted candidates
going to the second round. As pointed out in the introduction, and as
discussed more at length in Grofman (2008), there are many varieties of the
runo system and one typically expects variations in the rules of the game
to change the equilibrium set. In this section we discuss such changes for a
couple of important variants of the benchmark case.
7.1 Less than majority in the rst round
Some countries use a runo rule with z < 50: Thus, a candidate wins at the
rst round if its vote share is at least as high as that of any other candidate
and it is at least z% of the votes. Otherwise, the two top vote-getters go to
the second round where the election is decided by FPTP.
One rst consequence of this change is that the convergent equilibrium
disappears. In a convergent equilibrium all n players enter at the median
and get a vote share of 1=n. When z = 50 no protable deviation is possible
because a deviator can get a vote share arbitrary close, but inferior, to 50%
and therefore the second round is still triggered where the deviator loses
with certainty to one of the median candidates. If z < 50 this is no longer
true. It is possible to nd deviations insuring strictly more than z%, so that
the deviator gets elected right at the rst round. This implies that in the
case z < 50 equilibria, if they exist, can only be divergent.
Most of the results on characterisation established for the classical case
still hold for the case z < 50. In fact, it can be checked that Propositions 1
and 2 hold when z < 50. Thus, for example, divergent equilibria must have
20at least two candidates located at the extremes, since otherwise a single can-
didate would have an incentive to move towards the median. One immediate
implication is that a divergent equilibrium requires at least 4 players. This,
together with the non-existence of convergent equilibria, implies that there
is no equilibrium when n = 3.
It also remains true that equilibria with more than two policies can exist
generically, essentially for the same arguments proposed in the benchmark
case. For two-policy equilibria, unlike for the case with z = 50, existence
is however no longer guaranteed when z < 50. To see this, consider a
conguration in which r players enter at m   e and another r players enter
at m + e. In the classic case we never have to worry about entry (by a
new candidate or a deviator) on the wings, i.e. at locations y < m   e or
y > m+e. The reason is that no deviator in that region can get more than
50% of the vote in the rst round and it would face sure defeat in the second
round. When z < 50 deviations on the wings may become protable and
thus may destroy a two-policy equilibria. The logic is the same by which
z < 50 implies that a convergent equilibrium is possible. For example, it is
clear that no two-policy equilibrium in which not all players enter is possible
if F (m   e) > z or 1   F (m + e) > z, since an entrant could enter on the
wing and win the election in the rst round11. It is easy to see how this can
lead to non-existence. In fact, in order to prevent protable entry in the
interval (m   e;m + e) the value of e cannot be too large, but in order to
prevent protable entry outside that interval the value of e cannot be too
small. The two requirements become incompatible when z is suciently low.
When z approaches zero then runo becomes essentially indistinguishable
from FPTP, thus it has all the existence problems of FPTP. Even when
equilibria exists (for z suciently close to 50) there will be a lower bound
on e. Thus, smaller is z greater is the scope of extremism.
The case z > 50 is not interesting as it is equivalent to the case z = 50.
This follows from the fact that in equilibrium no candidate can get strictly
more than 50% of the vote at the rst round, no matter what the value of z
is. If a candidate gets more than 50% at the rst round then either it wins
outright or it moves with probability 1 to the second round where it wins
with probability 1, as its vote share cannot decrease when other candidates
drop out. This implies that no other candidate should enter, since it would
lose with probability one, so the equilibrium has a single entrant. This is
impossible, since another candidate can enter exactly at the same position,
get 50% of the vote and win the election with probability 1
2. Thus, for each
z  50 all equilibria have at least two entrants and each entrant gets no
more than 50% of the vote at the rst round. This implies that the rst
11To be precise, it has also to be the case that the entrant gets a vote share greater
than any other existing candidate. This is surely the case whenever z > 25; since at least
4 players enter and must tie, each of the existing candidates must have less than 25% of
the vote.
21round threshold is irrelevant, as long as it is not lower than 50.
7.2 More than two candidates in the second round
Existence problems may also appear when more than two candidates are
admitted to the second round. To x ideas, consider the rule used in the
French legislative elections that we rst describe. Any candidate that gets a
majority in round 1 wins outright; if that is not the case, then any candidate
that gets at least 12.5% of the votes in round 1 goes to round 2; if there
are exactly two candidates that get more than 12.5% in round 1, then only
these two candidates move to round 2; if exactly one candidate gets more
than 12.5%, then it goes to round 2 while exactly one candidate out of the
2nd highest shares is randomly chosen to go to round 2 and these are the
only two candidates in round 2; nally, if all candidates obtain less than
12.5%, then only two top voted candidates go to round 2.
In this case there is no convergent equilibrium for n  5. To see this,
suppose that ve candidates are located at the median and get 20% of the
vote each. In this case the second round is a repetition of the rst (all can-
didates go to the second round) and each candidate wins with probability
1/5. Consider now a deviation to m   " by one candidate, with " small.
That candidate gets slightly less than 50% of the vote, while the remaining
four candidates share the remaining votes an get (slightly more than) 12:5%
. Thus it remains true that all candidates move to the second round. As a
consequence the deviator wins the election and this implies that having all
candidates at the median is not an equilibrium12. When n > 5 a conver-
gent equilibrium may or may not exist, depending on the distribution. For
example, consider the case n = 6 and the uniform distribution on [0;1]. If
all candidates are located at the median and a deviator moves slightly to
the left or the right then the ve candidates remaining at the median get
about 10% of the vote. With a threshold of 12.5, only one of the candidates
is randomly selected for the second round, where it proceeds to defeats the
deviator. However, suppose that the deviator moves far away from the me-
dian, say to x = 0. In that case the deviator gets 25% of the vote and each
of the candidates remaining at the median get 15%. Thus, all candidates
go to the second round where the deviator wins. Thus in this case there is
no convergent equilibrium with n = 6. In general, for a threshold of 12.5 a
convergent equilibrium always exists when there are at least 9 candidates,
since after the deviation there will be 8 candidates sharing the constituency
12Things get more complicated when candidates are allowed to withdraw from the sec-
ond round. In the example just discussed the 4 candidates located at the median know
that they are going to lose for sure if at least two remain in the second round. Thus, we
can specify subgame perfect equilibria in which, say, in these situations only the candi-
date at the median with the lowest index does not withdraw. In this case the convergent
equilibrium is restored.
22of the median and they cannot possibly get more than 12.5% each. Thus in
that case a deviator is matched with a randomly chosen median candidate,
implying defeat for the deviator.
The general issue that appears from this discussion is that in the case
in which all the candidates above a certain threshold are admitted to the
second round, we again have to worry, as in the case z < 50, about deviations
that move a candidate away from the median to increase the vote share in
the rst round. The twist in this case is that the deviator does not want
to be `too successful', since it is important to make sure that the opponents
are able to get enough votes and make it to the second round, where they
will split the vote and let the deviator win.
While we have illustrated these problems with reference to convergent
equilibria, things are not dierent when we consider two-policy equilibria.
We already know that the policy positions in those equilibria cannot be
too far from the median, since protable entry at the centre would become
possible. When deviations away from the median may be protable, as in
the case under discussion, the policy positions can't be too close to the
median either. Thus, existence problems may appear.
8 Conclusions
We have provided a complete characterisation of the set of Nash equilibria
in the model of Osborne (1993) for the runo system. We have shown
that both convergent and divergent equilibria exist for any distribution of
voters' ideal policies and for any number of players. However, the most
prominent equilibria are those with two policies. This is because free entry
destroys convergent equilibria, divergent equilibria are robust to free entry
and equilibria with more than two policies do not always exist while those
with two policies always do.
In any equilibrium, extreme policies are proposed by at least two players
and all players who contest must obtain the same mass of votes in round 1
of the system. Although runo supports many policy equilibria, there is a
strong tendency that policies near the median voter's ideal point are most
likely to win, hence, runo promotes centrism. Multipolicy equilibria generi-
cally exist as well, and we observe some interesting generic properties there.
Firstly, in every three policy equilibrium, the middle policy is generically
dierent from the median while the extreme policies are equidistant from
the median. Next, all internal policies are proposed by exactly one player
while extreme policies need to necessarily be equidistant about the median
unless there are an even number of policies upon contest.
As documented in Blais et al. (1997), the runo is used in 49 democratic
countries while the FPTP system is used in only about 20. This itself
suggests the importance of runo. Our paper lls an important theoretical
23gap in the existing literature. As we have pointed out before, there is a
growing literature on this voting system. Some interesting extensions are
immediate. It would be good to study the sequential model with endogenous
entry timings as in Osborne (1993) to see how the runo compares in that
game with the FPTP that was studied there. It would also be important
to provide a complete characterisation of equilibria in the entry deterrence
game in Callander (2005) with more than 1 potential entrant. Uncertainty
of the median voters' ideal policy, as in Matsushima (2007) seems another
important aspect that one may wish to explore.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Fact 1. Let X = (fx1;:::;xkg;%) be the policy prole under consider-
ation. For point 1 take any 1 < i < k. Suppose that l(xi) = r(xi) and
xi  xi 1 = xi+1  xi. Since the policy prole is even, so bi 1 is the
Pi 1
j=1 %(xj)'th
%(X)-quantile and bi is the
Pi
j=1 %(xj)'th %(X)-quantile. Thus the assumption that















which is a non-generic property of F.
For point 2 suppose that policies xi and xj, with 1  i < j  k have balanced
support. Let dl = xl+1   xl, for i  l  j   1. Then di = 2(bi   xi) and
dl+1 = 2(bl+1   bl)   dl, for i  l  j   2. Solving this system of equations we get




On the other hand dj 1 = 2(xj   bj 1) and so




Since xi and xj have balanced support, so









and borders br correspond to proper %(X)-quantiles of F. Hence Equation (2) is a
non-generic property of F.
Proof of Lemma 1. Point 1 is obvious. Point 2 is also obvious for the case of two
candidates. When there are three or more candidates, each one of them must have
a strictly positive probability of winning. This cannot happen if at least two, but
not all, candidates tie for rst place, since those who do not tie for rst place would
be excluded from the second round with probability 1. Thus, either they all tie for
24rst place or there is a single candidate winning the rst round and all others tie
for second place.
Finally, consider point 3. Suppose k  2 and xk  m (the case m  x1 is
symmetric). We start noticing that in this case it must be (xi) < 1
2 for each
i < k and l(xk) < 1
2 as well. In equilibrium a candidate located at x1 must have
a positive probability of victory. The only way in which this can happen is that
the election goes to the second round and a candidate located at x1 is matched
with strictly positive probability to a candidate also located at x1, since all other
candidates are closer to the median. This implies that no candidate located at a
position dierent from x1 can go to the second round with probability 1, thus all
the candidates not located at x1 either tie for rst place with all other candidates
or they tie for the second place with all candidates except exactly one located at
x1. The latter is impossible in equilibrium, since there must be multiple candidates
located at x1. Thus, all candidates must tie for rst place. If xk < m, then any
player proposing x1 is better o by moving to m, since this would give outright
victory in the rst round, while the probability of winning under s must be strictly
less than 1. If xk = m then it is possible to nd " > 0 such that the constituency
of m + " is strictly greater than max1i<k (xi) and l(xk) + [F (m + "=2)   1=2].
Hence it is protable for a candidate proposing x1 to move to m+". The deviation
makes sure that the deviator strictly wins round 1 (with less than 50% of the vote),
it increases the vote share of the candidates located at x1 and it decreases the vote
share of the candidates located at m. Since at the initial situation all candidates
had the same vote share, in the second round the deviator faces a candidate located
at x1. Thus the deviating candidate always wins the rst round and then defeats
any other candidate in the second round, as she is closer to m
Proof of Proposition 1. Lemma 1 implies that an equilibrium policy prole is non-
empty and each entrant has a strictly positive probability of victory. To see that
extreme policies must be occupied by at least two candidates, suppose that k  2
and suppose that %(x1) = 1 (the case %(xk) = 1 is symmetric). Let i be the
candidate proposing x1. By Lemma 1 it must be x1 < m. If x2 > m, then i
is strictly better o by proposing m instead of x1, as this ensures victory with
probability 1. Thus, suppose x2  m and let j denote a candidate proposing x2.
Since, by Lemma 1, xk > m, it must be that k  3, i.e. at least three policy
positions are occupied. Since s is a Nash equilibrium, j has a positive probability
to go to the second round. But now observe that player i is strictly better o
by moving towards x2. To see this consider two cases: (a) i gets a vote share
strictly larger than that obtained by the other candidates under s, or (b) i ties
with some other candidate in the rst round under s. Suppose that case (a) holds.
By Lemma 1 all the other candidates tie for the second place in the rst round.
Hence by moving next to the left of x2 player i rules out these candidates from the
second round. This is because k  3 and so there are other candidates to the right
of x2 who will win with those at x2 after such a move. Moreover, the move can
only increase the chances of winning with any other candidate going to the second
round. Thus this move is protable for i in the case (a). Suppose that case (b)
holds. In this case the above argument is even stronger as the move makes i win
the rst round and increases his chances in the second round.
To see that all the candidates must tie in the rst round, let Xs = fx1;:::;xkg
and k  2 (the case k = 1 is obvious). By Lemma 1 we know that in the rst
round, at least %(mathcalX)   1 candidates are tied. If all of them are tied than
25we are done. Suppose then that exactly %s (Xs) 1 of them are tied. In such a case
there is a unique candidate w at position xw with the largest mass of votes, and
%(xw) = 1. This candidate reaches the second stage with probability 1. Since the
extreme positions have to be occupied by at least two candidates, this candidate
cannot be an extremist, i.e. w = 2 f1;kg. If xw  m, then all candidates at positions
xj with j > w have zero probability of victory, since they would be matched with
the candidate at xw. This cannot be an equilibrium. If xw < m, then the argument
is symmetric. We conclude that in equilibrium all candidates must tie in the rst
round.
Finally observe that, since in equilibrium each candidate has the same prob-
ability of getting to the second round, the probability of winning an election for
candidate i is equal to the probability of being matched with a candidate who is
farther away from the median than i plus one half the probability of being matched
with a candidate who as the same distance from the median as i. When there are at
least three positions occupied this implies that the probability of winning is strictly
decreasing in the distance from the median.
Proof of Proposition 2. To prove point 1, let s be a Nash equilibrium and Xs be
the policy prole under it, as stated in the proposition. To see that q %(x1) 1
%(Xs)

x1, suppose not. By Proposition 1 all the candidates tie in the rst round, each
obtaining the support S = 1=%(Xs). Since the property is violated for x1, so r(x1)
of x1 is > S. But then one of the candidates proposing x1 could deviate slightly
to the right of x1 to obtain a vote share S0  S (recall that by Proposition 1,
%(x1)  2). There are two cases that need to be analysed separately. Firstly
suppose that k = 2. In this case, after the deviation, all the remaining candidates
proposing x1 and the candidates proposing x2 get their support reduced and lose
the rst round, while the deviator wins that round. In the second round he always
wins, hence the deviation is protable, which contradict the assumptions that s is
a Nash equilibrium. Secondly, suppose that k  3. As in the previous case, all
the remaining candidates proposing x1 and the candidates proposing x2 get their
support reduced and lose the rst round. Hence the only candidates that have
a chance of going to the second round are those proposing the policies xi with
i  3 and the deviator. If x2 is closer to the median than x1, then the deviation
is protable for the deviator, as he rules out at least one candidate with whom
he was previously losing, while he does not decrease his chances of winning in all
the remaining matches. Suppose that x2   m  m   x1. In this case the deviator
always wins in the second round, while he increases his chances of winning in the
rst round, ruling out the candidates proposing x1 and x2. Hence the deviation is
protable as well and again we get a contradiction with the assumption that s is




For the remaining part of point 1, notice that, by what we have shown above,
it holds that r(x1)  S, with equality possible only in the case %(x1) = 2, and
similarly for xk (where S = 1=%(Xs)). Now suppose that the claim stated in that
part of point 1 does not hold. Then either m   x1 < xk   m with l(x1) > S, or
m   x1 > xk   m with r(xk) > S. Suppose that m   x1 > m   xk with with
r(xk) > S (the other case is symmetric). Then one of the candidates proposing xk
could deviate to x just to the right of xk, so that he obtains the support S0 > S and
jx mj < jxi  mj, for all i such that xk  m < jxi  mj (notice that this is true at
26least for i = 1). Let w denote the number of candidates proposing a policy further
from m than xk and t denote the number of candidates proposing a policy dierent
from xk, which is in the same distance from m as xk is. Before the deviation any
candidate proposing xk wins with the probability













Hence there is always a protable deviation for him, which contradicts the assump-
tion that s is a Nash equilibrium.
To prove point 2, suppose rst that m   x1 = xk   m and assume that m  b1
(the case m > bk 1 is symmetric). Then x2   m  m   x1 and since k  3, so
xk > x2 and, consequently, xk   m > m   x1, which contradict the assumption
that m   x1 = xk   m. Secondly suppose that m   x1 6= xk   m and assume
that m   x1 > xk   m (the case m   x1 < xk   m is symmetric). By point 1,
%(xk) = 2. Moreover, by Proposition 1, there are at least 5 candidates if k  3 and
each candidate obtains the same mass of votes. Thus it must be that m < bk 1,
as otherwise the candidates proposing xk would obtain larger mass of votes than
the remaining  3 candidates. To see that b1 < m assume the opposite. Then
x2   m  m   x1 and, consequently xk   m > m   x1, which contradicts our
assumptions.
To prove point 3, let s be a Nash equilibrium and Xs be the policy prole under
it, as stated in that point.
To see that internal policies must be at most binary and if binary, then they
must have balanced constituency, assume the opposite. Then k  2 and there exists
1 < i < k such that either l(xi) > S or r(xi) > S, where S = 1=%(Xs). Without
loss of generality suppose that xi  m (the other case is symmetric). Assume also
that r(xi) > S (the case of l(xi) > S can be shown by similar arguments and is
easier). Since r(xi) > S, so it must be that %(xi)  2. Now, one of the candidates
proposing xi just to the right and suciently close, so that he obtains a support
S0 > S and is closer to the median than any policy further from the median than
xi. Using analogous arguments to those used in proof of point 1 for extreme policy
strictly closer to the median, it can be shown that this deviation is protable, which
contradicts the assumption that s is a Nash equilibrium.
For the remaining part of point 3 assume the opposite, that is suppose that there
is a unary policy lying between two binary policies with balanced constituency. Let
this policy be xi, with 1 < i < k. Let S be the mass of support obtained by each
candidate in the rst round. Since both the policies xi 1 and xi+1 have balanced
constituency and are binary, so F (xi 1)   F (xi+1) = 3S. Hence either
F ((xi 1 + xi+1)=2)   F (xi 1)  3S=2 or
F (xi+1)   F ((xi 1 + xi+1)=2)  3S=2:
Without loss of generality suppose that the rst case holds. Since F is non atomic
and F (bi 1) F (xi 1) = S, so there must exist t 2 (xi 1;xi) such that F (bi 1) 
F ((xi 1 + t)=2) > 3S=4. We will show that if player i proposed t instead of xi,
27then he would win outright. Take any t satisfying the condition above and suppose
that player i proposed t instead of xi. Let
S1 = F (bi)   F ((t + xi+1)=2) and
S2 = F (bi 1)   F ((xi 1 + t)=2):
By the construction above it holds that S2 > 3S=4. Moreover, since
(xi 1 + xi+1)=2 < (t + xi+1)=2 < bi; so
F (xi+1)   F ((xi 1 + xi+1)=2)  3S=2 and F (xi+1)   F (bi) = S. Thus S1 < S=2.
The mass of support that player i gets after repositioning himself to t is S  
S1 + S2 > 5S=4, while the mass of support the candidates proposing xi+1 get is
(2S + S1)=2 < 5S=4. Also, the mass of support the candidates proposing xi 1 get
is < S. Hence player i wins the rst round and increases his chances of winning
the second round after repositioning himself to t.
Proof of Proposition 4. First we show that the equilibrium exists. Take any 2 
r  n=2 and e < minfdr(F);er(F)g and consider a strategy prole s with a policy
prole Xs = (fm e;m+eg;%) such that %(x1) = %(x2) = r. Suppose that n > 2r.
Then there is no entry between m   e and m + e that would lead to at least tying
for the rst place in the rst round, by the fact that e < er(F). No entry at m  e
or m + e is protable as well, as in such a case the entrant cannot win the rst
round and, since r  2, there will be at least two candidates proposing the other
policy who will get to the second round. No entry outside the interval [m e;m+e]
is protable, because it always leads to losing in the second round. Consider any
candidate under s. Exit by such a candidate is not protable. Repositioning to the
outside of the interval [m   e;m + e] is not protable, because it always leads to
losing in the second round. Repositioning to the inside is not protable by the fact
that e < dr(F). Thus s is a Nash equilibrium.
In the second part we show that if s is a Nash equilibrium with policy prole
Xs = (fx1;x2g;%), then points 1 { 4 have to be satised. For point 1 suppose that
the opposite holds and assume that x1 = m   e, while x2 = m + e0 with e0 > e
(the case e0 < e is symmetric). Since, by Proposition 1, all the players must get
the same support in the rst round, so it must be that %(x1) > %(x2). Moreover,
by the same proposition, extreme policies must be at least binary, hence it follows
that %(x1)  3. On the other hand, by Proposition 2, %(x1) = 2 and we get a
contradiction. Thus it must be that e = e0.
For point 2 notice that %(x1) = %(x2) follows immediately from point 1. As
noted above, it must also be that %(x1)  2.
For point 3, assume the opposite. Suppose rst that r  3. In this case
e  dr(F) implies that there is a position t 2 (m   e;m + e) such that a candidate
proposing one of the extreme positions could deviate there and at least tie for the
rst place in the rst round. Since such deviation guarantees winning the second
round and does not decrease the chances of winning the rst round, so it is always
protable. Thus if s is a Nash equilibrium, then it must be that e < dr(F), if r  3.
Suppose now that r = 2. In this case e  dr(F) implies that there is a position
t 2 (m   e;m + e) such that a candidate proposing one of the extreme positions
could deviate there and at least tie for the second place in the rst round. If he
wins or ties for the rst place in the rst round, then the deviation is protable by
28the same arguments as those used above. Suppose then that he ties for the second
place. Then it must be that the remaining candidate from the original position
of the deviator wins the rst round, and the deviator ties with the remaining two
candidates. Moreover, getting to the second round guarantees him winning the
elections. Hence the deviation increases his chances of winning and so it is protable
as well. Thus if s is a Nash equilibrium, then it must be that e < dr(F), if r = 2.
For point 4 notice that if %(Xs) < n and e  er(F), then one of the candidates
standing out of the elections could always enter at some t 2 (m   e;m + e) and
at least tie for the rst place in the rst round. Moreover, winning the rst round
guarantees him winning the elections. Hence entering would be always protable
for him, which would contradict the assumption that s is a Nash equilibrium. Thus
it must be that e < er(F) if the number of candidates is smaller than the number
of players.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that s is a Nash equilibrium with policy prole
Xs = (fx1;x2;x3g;%).
We start with showing the following points, which give some general properties
of any three-policy equilibria.
(i). %(x1) = %(x3)  2 and %(x2)  2.
(ii). If %(x2) = 2, then x2 = m.
(iii). If m   x1 6= x3   m, then %(x2) = 2 and x1 = F 1(1
6), x2 = m and x3 =
F 1(1
6).
For point (i) notice rst that, by Proposition 1, %(x1);%(x3)  2. Moreover,
by point 3 of Proposition 2, %(x2)  2. Suppose now that %(x1) > %(x3) (the case
%(x1) < %(x3) is symmetric). Then it must be that %(x1)  3. Moreover, since
%(x1)  %(x3) + 1 and, by Proposition 1, each candidate obtains the same mass of
support, so (x1 + x2)=2  m. Hence m   x1 < x3   m, which contradicts point 1
of Proposition 2. Hence it must be that %(x1) = %(x3).
For point (ii) assume that %(x2) = 2. Then, by point 3 of Proposition 2, the
constituency of x2 is balanced. Since %(x1) = %(x3) and all the candidates obtain
the same support in equilibrium, so the mass of voters to the left or x2 must be
equal to the mass of voters to the right of x2, that is x2 = m.
For point (iii) we will use the following claim.
Claim 1. Suppose that %(x2) = 1. Then the following points hold:










Proof. We will show point (i). Point (ii) can be shown by symmetric arguments. By
Proposition 1, each candidate obtains the same mass of votes, S = 1
%(Xs). Suppose
that %(x2) = 1 and assume that r(x1) > T, where T =
%(Xs)+1
2(%(Xs) 1)S. Then there
exists x1 < z < b1 such that the mass of votes between z and b1, F(b1) F(z) = T.
By moving to x0 = 2z   x1 the candidate proposing x2 gains the mass of votes
between z and b1, T, and loses the mass of votes U between b2 and b2   b1 + z,





d1 d1 d2 d2
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x2
Figure 1: Equilibrium three-policy conguration with m   x1 = x3   m.
must be that b1 < m < b2. Moreover, F(m)   F(b1) = F(b2)   F(m) = S
2, as by
point (i), %(x1) = %(x3) and each candidate obtains the same mass of votes. Since
m x1  x3  m, so b2  b1 +z = x3 x1
2 +z > m and so U < S
2. Now, the mass of
votes gained by the candidate moving to x0 is T  U > S
%(Xs) 1. On the other hand,
the mass of votes gained by each candidate proposing x3 is 2U
%(Xs) 1 < S
%(Xs) 1.
The candidates proposing x1 only lose their support when the middle candidate
moves to x0. Notice also that m   x0 < x3   m, as m   x1  x3   m. Hence the
middle candidate wins the rst round and always wins in the second round after
repositioning. Thus there is a protable deviation for him, which contradicts the
assumption that s is a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose now that m   x1 6= x2   m and assume that %(x2) 6= 2. Then, by
point (i), %(x2) = 1. Suppose that m  x1 < x2   m (the other case is symmetric).






%(Xs)  5). Thus we get a contradiction with Claim 1. This shows that point (iii)
holds.
For point 2 notice that point (iii) implies, in particular, that if m x1 6= x2 m,
then there are two binary policies with balanced support proposed in equilibrium.
Hence, by Fact 1, such equilibria are non-generic and in any generic equilibrium
it must hold that m   x1 6= x2   m. By point 2 of Proposition 2 it must be that
b1 < m < b2. Let d1 = x1+x2
2 , d2 = x2+x3
2 , z1 = m   b1 and z2 = b2   m (c.f.
Figure 1).
Then
d1 + d2 =z1 + z2 (3)
d1 + z1 =d2 + z2:
Solving this system of equations we get d1 = z2 and d2 = z1. From the fact that
x1 = b1   d1, x2 = b2 + d1 and x3 = b2 + d2 we obtain
x1 =m + b1   b2;
x2 =b1 + b2   m;
x3 =m   b1 + b2:
Since, by Proposition 1, all the candidates obtain the same mass of votes in the
rst round, so it must be that b1 = q r
2r+1 and b2 = q r+1
2r+1.
For point 3 notice that part of it is implied by point (i) and we only need to
show that in any generic case %(x2) = 1. Assume the opposite. Then, by point (i)
30it must be that %(x2) = 2 and, by point (ii) it must be that x2 = m. This, together
with point 2 implies that q r
2r+1 + q r+1
2r+1 = 2m, which is a non-generic property of
the distribution. Thus in any generic case it must be that %(x2) = 1.
Proof of Proposition 6. We start with the right to left implication and show that
the conditions 1 { 4 are necessary. Suppose that s is a Nash equilibrium with the
policy prole satisfying the properties stated in the proposition.
To see that condition 1 must hold assume the opposite. This means that there
exists t 2
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and, by (4), S2  S1. Moreover, S1 > S3, the mass of support received by any
candidate proposing x3 after the deviation. Thus either the deviating candidate
wins the rst and the second round or he ties in the rst round with the candidates
proposing x1 and always wins if selected for the second round. Hence the deviation
is protable, which contradicts the assumption that s is a Nash equilibrium and so
condition 1 is necessary. Analogous arguments can be used to show that condition 2
is necessary.
To see that condition 3 is necessary assume the opposite. Then there exists
t 2






such that the condition is violated. Thus a player




2 obtaining a mass of votes  1
2r+1, which allows him
to win the rst and the second round with positive probability. Since n > 2r + 1,
so there are player who are not candidates under s and so there exists a protable
deviation for any such player. Condition 4 is necessary by similar arguments, as it
prevents entry within the interval (x2;x3).
Now we show that the conditions 1 { 4 are sucient. Suppose that F satises
the conditions and consider any strategy prole s which yields the policy prole as
described in the proposition and with
x1 = m + q r
2r+1   q r+1
2r+1; x2 = q r
2r+1 + q r+1
2r+1   m; x3 = m   q r
2r+1 + q r+1
2r+1:
Firstly, it is not protable for any candidate to stay out of the elections, as each of
them obtains the same mass of votes under s.
Secondly, there is no z 2 R such that it would be protable for the candidate
proposing x2 to deviate to z. Deviation to z < x1 or z > x3 is not protable,
because the deviating candidate would always loose in the second round. Deviation
to z = x1 or z = x3 is not protable, because no candidate proposing z would win
the rst round then. Since x1 and x3 are symmetric about m, so two candidates
31proposing the other extreme would receive more votes and win. Deviation to z 2
(x1;x2) is ruled out by condition 1. For suppose that there is such a deviation
which is protable. This means that the deviating candidate does not loose with
any of the candidates proposing x3. Thus there must exist t 2 (0;x2 b1) such that
F(x1 + t + x2   b1)   F(x1 + t) 
F(x1 + t + x2   b1)
r
: (7)

















which contradicts condition 1. Hence a deviation to z 2 (x1;x2) is not possible. By
similar arguments it can be shown that a deviation to z 2 (x2;x3) is ruled out by
condition 2.
Thirdly, there is no protable deviation to any z 2 R by a candidate proposing
the extreme position x1. Deviation to z < x1 or z > x3 is not protable as it never
allows for winning in the second round. Deviation to the other extreme, x3, or to
x2 leads to losing the rst round. Suppose that there is a protable deviation to
some z 2 (x1;x2). This means that moving to z the deviating candidate obtains
the support  1
2r+1, because to have a chance to proceed to the next round he
cannot lose with any candidate proposing the extreme position x3, the support of
which is not aected by this deviation. This contradict condition 3 and so no such
deviation is possible. Similarly, by condition 4, there is no protable deviation to
z 2 (x2;x3).
Lastly, there is no protable entry from any player who did not enter. Entries
at positions outside the extreme positions are ruled out, because they do not allow
for winning in the second round. Entries at positions x1, x2 and x3 are ruled out,
because they lead to losing the rst round. Entries at positions within intervals
(x1;x2) and (x2;x3) are ruled out by conditions 3 and 4, respectively, by arguments
given above.
Proof of Proposition 7. In the proof we will refer to the following values, uniquely
determined by the distribution F, total number of contesting candidates c  1,







If b a is odd, then Qc
a;b is the sum of distances between subsequent even and odd
c-quantiles, counted starting from the a'th one and up to the b'th one. If b   a is
even, then it is similar from the a'th to the (b   1)'th c'quantile, but additionally
the b'th c-quantile is subtracted at the end.
We divide the proof into two lemmas that deal with cases of even and odd
numbers of policies separately. In both cases we give the formulas specifying the
policies proposed in any generic equilibrium, given the distribution F, the number
of policies k and the number of candidates c.
Lemma 2. Let n be the number of players and suppose that s is a Nash equilibrium
with policy prole Xs = (fx1;:::;xkg;%), where %(Xs) = c and k  4 is even. Then
the following must hold in any generic case:
321. m   x1 6= xk   m.
2. For all 1 < i < k, %(xi) = 1.
3. m   q 1
c 6= q c 1
c   m.
4. If m   q 1
c < q c 1







1  i  k.
5. If m   q 1
c > q c 1
c   m, then %(xk) = 2 and xi = ( 1)i 1(2(Qc
c k;c 2  
Qc
c k;c k+i 2)   q c 1
c ), for 1  i  k.
Proof. For point 1 let di = bi xi, for 1  i  n 1 and suppose that m 2 [bi 1;bi].
By point 1 of Proposition 2, 2  i  n 1. Let zi 1 = m bi 1 and let zi = bi m.
Then
di 1 + di = zi 1 + zi: (9)








Suppose that i is even. From Equation (9) we get di 1 = zi 1 + zi   di. Inserting
this in Equation (10) we obtain
i 2 X
j=1














(b2j+1   b2j): (12)
By Proposition 1 the policy prole Xs must be even and, as we observed in Sec-
tion 3.1, each of bi's is a proper %(Xs)-quantile of the distribution F (c.f. Equa-
tion (1)). Thus for any xed policy prole, Equation (12) is a non-generic property
of a distribution. Hence in any generic case with i being even it must be that
m   x1 6= xk   m.
Suppose now that i is odd. The analysis here is analogous to the previous case.



















(b2j+1   b2j): (14)
33Again, this equation is a non-generic property of a distribution, hence in any generic
case with i being odd it must be that m   x1 6= xk   m.
Point 2 follows immediately from point 1, Fact 1, and points 1 and 3 of Propo-
sition 2.
For points 4 and 5 notice that since m x1 6= xk  m so, by point 1 of Proposi-
tion 2, either %x1 = 2, its constituency is balanced and m x1 < xk m, or %xk = 2,
its constituency is balanced and m x1 > xk  m. This implies, in particular, that
either x1 = q 1
c or xk = q c 1
c , respectively. Moreover, if m q 1
c < q c 1
c  m, then it
must be that %x1 = 2 and x1 = q 1
c. Similarly, if m   q 1
c > q c 1
c   m, then it must
be that %xk = 2 and xk = q c 1
c . Suppose that x1 = q 1
c. Since each of the internal
policies is proposed by exactly one candidate and each candidate obtains the same
support, so xi must be the reection of xi 1 in q i







, for 1  i  k, which shows that points 4 holds.
Point 5 can be shown analogously.
Lemma 3. Let n be the number of players and suppose that s is a Nash equilibrium
with policy prole Xs = (fx1;:::;xkg;%), where %(Xs) = c and k  5 is odd. Then
the following must hold in any generic case:
1. For all 1 < i < k, %(xi) = 1.
2. If 2m  q 1
c + q k
c , or q 1
c + q k
c < 2m < q 2
c + q k+1
c and m   q 1
c < Qc
2;k, then
%(x1) = 2 and xi = ( 1)i 1(q 1
c + 2Qc
2;i), for all 1  i  k.
3. If q 1
c + q k
c < 2m < q 2
c + q k+1
c and m   q 1
c  Qc
2;k, then %(x1) = 2 and
xi = ( 1)i 1(m + 2Qc
2;i   Qc
2;k), for all 1  i  k.
4. If q r 1
c + q k+r 2
c < 2m < q r
c + q k+r 1
c with 3  r  c   k   1, then %(x1) = r
and xi = ( 1)i 1(m + 2Qc
r;r+i 2   Qc
r;r+k 2), for all 1  i  k.
5. If q c k 1
c + q c 2
c < 2m < q c k
c + q c 1
c and q c 1
c   m  Qc
c k;c 2, then
%(x1) = c   k and xi = ( 1)i 1(m + 2Qc
c k;c k+i 2   Qc
c k;c 2), for all
1  i  k.
6. If q c k
c + q c 1
c  2m, or q c k 1
c + q c 2
c < 2m < q c k
c + q c 1
c and q c 1
c  
m < Qc




c k;c k+i 2)), for all 1  i  k.
Proof. We start with showing that positions of the policies are uniquely determined
by % and the symmetry of extreme policies with respect to m. Suppose rst that
m   x1 = xk   m. Like in proof of Lemma 2, let di = bi   xi, for 1  i  n   1
and suppose that m 2 [bi 1;bi]. By point 2 of Proposition 2, 2  i  n   1. Let
zi 1 = m   bi 1 and let zi = bi   m. Then
di 1 + di = zi 1 + zi: (15)








34Suppose that i is even. Like in proof of Lemma 2 we get
i 2 X
j=1














(b2j   b2j 1): (18)
From this we obtain
i 1 X
j=1












By similar analysis for i being odd we get























From Equation (22) we get




Since x1 = b1   d1, so
























By Proposition 1 the policy prole Xs must be even and, as we observed in Sec-
tion 3.1, each of bi's is a proper %(Xs)-quantile of the distribution F (c.f. Equa-
tion (1)). Hence all xi, with 1  xi  k, are uniquely determined by % in this
case.
35If m x1 < xk m, then, by point 1 of Proposition 2, it must be that %(x1) = 2
and its constituency is balanced. Hence x1 = q 1
c and all xi, for the remaining
2  i  k, can be determined by the fact that the policy prole is even and xi+1
is the reection of xi in bi. Similarly, the policies xi are uniquely determined if
m   x1 > xk   m.
For point 1 suppose that there is an internal policy xi which is not proposed by
one candidate. By point 3 of Proposition 2 it must be proposed by two candidates
and the constituency of xi must be balanced. Moreover, by Fact 1, in any generic
case there can be at most one such policy. Since each candidate obtains the same
mass of votes in the rst round, so
xi = q %(x1)+i 1
c
: (26)
On the other hand, from Equation (25) and from the fact that all the internal





















Both Equations (26) and (27) being satised is a non-generic property of the distri-
bution. Hence in any generic case each internal policy must be proposed by exactly
one candidate.
For points 2 { 6 notice rst that by point 1 of Proposition 2 and by the fact
that all the candidates obtain the same support in the rst round and since all the









 xk  q %(x1)+k 1
c
: (29)
Suppose that m   x1 = xk   m. This, together with Inequalities (28 { 29)
implies that




  m and (30)





Suppose that m   x1 < xk   m. By point 1 of Proposition 2 it must be that
%(x1) = 2 and, by Inequalities (28 { 29), it must be that
m   q 1
c < q k+1
c   m (32)
Similarly, if m   x1 > xk   m, then it must be that %(xk) = 2 (and %(x1) = c   k)
and, by Inequalities (28 { 29), it must be that
m   q c k 1
c > q c 1
c   m: (33)
Suppose now that q r
c + q r+k 1
c < 2m < q r+k 2
c + q r 1
c with 3  r  c   k   1.
Then, by Inequalities (28 { 33), it must be that %(x1) = r and, by Proposition 1,
36it must be that m   x1 = xk   m. Each xi, with 1  i  k must be like in
Equation (27).
Suppose that 2m  q r
c + q r+k 1
c . Then, by Inequalities (28 { 33), it must be
that %(x1) = 2, m x1 < xk  m and the constituency of x1 is balanced. Since the
mass of support obtained by each candidate in the rst round must be the same








for 1  i  k. The case of q r+k 2
c + q r 1
c  2m can be shown analogously.
Lastly suppose that q 2
c + q k+1
c < 2m < q k
c + q 1
c. Then, by Inequalities (28
{ 33), it must be that %(x1) = 2 and either m   x1 = xk   m or m   x1 < xk   m.
If m   x1 = xk   m, then, by Equation (27), x1 = m   Qc
2;k. Since, by point 1
of Proposition 2, it must be that x1  q 1
c, so if m   q 1
c < Qc
2;k, then it must
be that m   x1 < xk   m and x1 = q 1
c. The policies proposed must be like in
Equation (34). If m   x1 < xk   m, then, by Equation (34), xk = q 1
c + 2Qc
2;k. By
the facts that m x1 < xk  m and x1 = q 1





2;k, then it must be that m x1 = xk m and. The policies proposed
must be like in Equation (27). The case of q c k
c + q c 1
c < 2m < q c 2
c + q c k 1
c can
be shown analogously.
Both lemmas shown above imply immediately the result stated in the proposi-
tion.
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